Klow's Kollection

Civil War Ironclads

Two warships dueled in Hampton Roads off the coast of Virginia on March 9, 1862.

One was the Confederate frigate CSS Virginia (formerly Merrimack), an older steam-powered ship with its hull fortified with iron plates. This made the ship invulnerable to most naval weapons of the time. The previous day, she soundly defeated Union warships Congress and Cumberland, older vessels which still used sails.

Virginia returned in the morning to finish her work when the second player in this drama arrived, USS Monitor. Monitor was an iron armored ship as well, but she was newly built with one major innovation Virginia did not have. Monitor's two guns were mounted on a revolving turret, while most of Virginia's ten guns were mounted along the sides.

 CSS Virginia (left) exchanges fire with Monitor.

The two pounded each other but despite some damage, the battle was a draw. Neither ship could penetrate their opponent's iron-plated armor. Yet, the tactical advantages of Monitor's turret was noticed by naval officers and designers from around the world. The ship merely needed to rotate all of her guns and not reposition the entire ship to attack. Virginia could deliver broadsides with at most half her guns but she had to maneuver the ship to get a clean shot.

This battle not only marked the first engagement between iron-armored warships but the beginning of modern warships with turreted weapons, steam-powered, and armor plating.

 HMS Dreadnought

Photos from Naval History and Heritage site

 

Lincoln's General Order 1

After the first Battle of Bull Run, the Civil War started badly for President Lincoln and the Union.

Following months of inactivity by the Army of the Potomac, President Lincoln would take a personal hand in directing the movements of Union forces. Frustrated by his generals' timidity, he issued General Order 1 instructing that all commanders and forces of the United States would advance "against the insurgent forces" no later than February 22, 1862.

 

Before Lincoln issued the order, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan, had not divulged his plans for attacking the enemy despite repeated requests. McClellan did propose a campaign to move on the Virginia peninsula against Richmond. Though not overly confident of the plan, Lincoln approved if only to get McClellan moving.

General Order 1 did not sit well with McClellan.

Lincoln vs McClellan: A Review of Tried By War

"Early one morning during his visit to the army, Lincoln asked a friend as they strolled through the camps: 'Hatch, what do you suppose all those people are?' Why the Army of the Potomac, a surprised Ozias Hatch replied. 'No, you are mistaken," said the president. 'This is General McClellan's bodyguard.' "

- Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief by James M. McPherson

 

 Most Civil War books tend to focus on the Emancipation of the slaves or give minute details of battles. Rarely, if ever, do they focus on national policy or strategy. McPherson's Tried By War does just that. Published in 2008, Lisa gave this to me for the Holidays and I was immediately hooked. It is expeptionally written, not dry but fluid and even entertaining. After reading some of Lincoln's witty comments to Lisa, she wanted to read the book. Her initial impression: the book is "very accessible."

A good portion deals with Lincoln's frustration with his generals who were too passive in their attempts to crush the Southern rebellion. Many, especially McClellan, believed manuvering forces with minimal bloodshed and striking when they were ready would subdue the South, forcing them to negotiate. Lincoln would have none of it. After First Bull Run and Shiloh, he changed his strategic views from simply retaking federal property in the rebelling states to conquest and the destruction of the Confederate forces in order to preserve the country. Possessing no military experience, Lincoln engaged in a crash course in military strategy and quickly understood the necessity to commit his forces to fight.  

Lincoln was initially impressed when newly promoted Union commander General McClellan reorganized the Army of the Potomac into an effective fighting force. One problem: McClellan would not fight. Instead, he preferred to sit in the mud and cry and beg for more troops. Thanks to inflated intelligence, McClellan believed Confederate forces facing him were as large or larger than his own forces.

By the middle of 1862, Lincoln was losing patience. He would spend many days and nights at the War Department's telegraph office, personally issuing orders and responding to his generals' reports and recommendations, which were full of complaints and excuses. In one exchange, Gen. McClellan responded to Lincoln's insistence he conduct cavalry raids against the South. He stated it could not be done because of "his own lack of cavalry and good horses," even though 13,000 of them were shipped to him seven weeks earlier. Also, the "Young Napoleon" sent a report of "sore-tongued horses absolutely broken down from fatigue and want of flesh." Lincoln angrily fired back; "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses in your army were doing since the Battle of Antietam that fatigue[s] anything? (McPherson: 139-40)

This was what Lincoln had to endure throughout his presidency. Overcoming feeble generals, waning public opinion, and his own inexperience in military matters, he would lead the Union to victory. That victory would bear a terrible cost in men and capital which Lincoln knew was necessary.

After finishing the book, I thought of French Prime Minister Clemenceau's comment on the First World War; "La guerre! C’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires." (War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.)

 
 

 

Lincoln's Christmas Gift

Message to President Lincoln: "I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the City of Savannah."-William T. Sherman

 

 

 

On the morning of December 22, 1864, General William T. Sherman informed President Lincoln of his successful capture of Savannah, Georgia, marking the end of Sherman's March to the Sea.

Image from American Civil War site 

After taking Atlanta, Sherman was confident that his march was possible and he could "make Georgia howl" by destroying the economic and rail infrastructure that would supply the Confederate's war effort. He proceeded east in two wings with a small contingent of troops heading back to Nashville. Sherman would  ravage the industrial sites of Augusta and Macon, leaving burned husks and ruined railroads in his army's path. Attempts by Confederate General Hood (who lost Atlanta to Sherman) to draw Sherman away from Georgia failed, allowing Sherman to proceed to Savannah which was captured on December 21, 1864 after the Confederate garrison of 13,000 withdrew. 

 President Lincoln was not confident of Sherman's success at first but admitted to Sherman in his reply that the victory was “his and his alone.” The North was elated, the South horrified and branded Sherman as the Devil himself. Sherman brushed off both reactions, commenting in his memoirs:

I only regarded the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a shift of base, as the transfer of a strong army...from the interior to a point on the sea coast, from which it could achieve other important results. I considered this march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war. Still, then and now, the march was regarded as something extraordinary...; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond. (Sherman: 220-21)

This movement would continue toward South Carolina which would suffer more harshly than did Georgia. This was where Secession began and, in Sherman's eyes, would dishearten the Confederacy still further.

Books:

The American Civil War: This Mighty Scourge of War, Gary W. Gallagher, et al. Osprey Publishing, 2003.

The Memoirs of William T. Sherman, William T. Sherman, Indiana University Press, 1957.

Burnside's Folly: Fredericksburg 1862

"It is well that war is so terrible-we should grow too fond of it."

Gen. Robert E. Lee during the Battle of Fredericksburg.

Those words were uttered during the Union's fruitless assaults against the strong Confederate defenses on hills overlooking the town of Fredericksburg, Virginia on December 13, 1862. Fourteen Union attacks were made resulting only in horrific casualties as Confederate troops cut down the piecemeal brigade-sized assaults. As a newspaper reporter commented; "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor(...) or generals to manifest less judgement." (McPherson: 572)

General Ambrose E. Burnside (pictured) assumed command of the Army of the Potomac after General McClellan was at last dismissed as commander for his failure to destroy General Lee's Army of Northern Virgina at Antietam. Burnside twice refuse command claiming an inadequate ability to command large forces. But his earlier successes, including taking Confederate positions along the North Carolina coast, made him appear the most capable commander. Sadly, Burnside's inability to adapt coupled with becoming flustered in the face of uncertainty would emerge in this battle resulting in another disaster for the Union.

At first, Burnside was doing well. He moved toward the Rappahannock River believing his supply lines would be more secure with naval assets protecting them instead of relying on more vulnerable railroads. But there were numerous rivers to cross. Burnside planned to deploy pontoon bridges in advance and get across before Lee could arrive.

The bridges did arrive...nineteen days later.

 During this lull, Burnside became flustered, unable to conceive a Plan B. The pontoon crossings were his only play. Even though there were points where the river could be easily forded, Burnside would not move his forces across until the pontoons arrived. Once they finally arrived, Lee's forces were waiting in the hills overlooking the town, leaving a brigade of Mississippi troops in the town to harass the Union army. After shelling the town, Burnside's men did cross into Fredericksburg on December 11 driving back the handful of Mississippi troops. The rest of December 11th and all of the 12th, Union soldiers prepared for the coming battle by looting the town, smashing furniture and glassware inside the "rebel" houses.

 The battle began on December 13 with Burnside intending to conduct a frontal assault with his soldiers numbering over 110,000 against Confederate defenses manned by around 75,000 soldiers. Burnside was convinced the Confederates would be surprised and unprepared for such an attack.

But Lee and his generals were indeed prepared. In the nineteen days while Burnside fumbled, the Confederates deployed artillery and earthworks along the already defensible high ground overlooking the town. One of General Longstreet's artillery officers boasted that "a chicken could not live in that field when we open up on it." His boast was justified as Union troops began assaulting the defenses.

General Lee could afford to wait during the winter letting the Union bleed their forces white. Burnside could not, as President Lincoln and the American public were expecting a victory. With this in mind, Burnside gave the order to attack.

The Union left wing under General William B. Franklin would assault the Confederate right under Stonewall Jackson. Confusing orders from Burnside confounded the timid General Franklin who sent his forces piecemeal into the fight. A breakthrough seemed likely when General Meade's forces reached Prospect Hill but Franklin did not exploit it and Confederate reinforcements turned back the assault. The Union right wing under General Hooker fared no better against General Longstreet's positions on the Confederate left. Fourteen piecemeal assaults against Confederate positions resulted in a disaster for the Union. At the end of the day, the Union suffered over 13,000 casualties, the South close to 5,000. Moved by the bravery of the Union troops, Lee agreed to a truce offered by Burnside to recover his men in the freezing night.

The next day, Burnside had to be talked out of leading a new assault and instead conducted a withdrawal of his forces back from Fredericksburg. Union morale all but totally collapsed as Confederate morale soared, their troops taunting Union soldiers as they moved to winter quarters in Falmouth. Upon learning of the disaster at Fredericksburg, President Lincoln said in frustration; "If there is a worse place than Hell, I am in it." 

Burnside himself took the blame and was removed from his command but not the service, sent to command his old IX Ohio Corps. However, he also believed some of his officers were conspiring to discredit him, including Joseph Hooker, and wanted them court-martialed. Lincoln seemed to feel a bit of sympathy toward Burnside, hence the reason the General was simply transferred and not outright dismissed. General Hooker would take over, despite his criticism of Burnside or perhaps because of it. Hooker's command was short-lived after the even greater disaster at Chancellorsville.

One can feel sympathy for Burnside after Fredericksburg. But after the battle, Union soldiers and line officers would say otherwise. Cold and dispirited, they felt that their bravery was overshadowed by incompetent commanders. This would continue throughout the first half of 1863 until the fortunes of war would change at Gettysburg.

 Books:

 Battle Cry of Freedom:The Civil War Era. James M. McPherson, Ballantine Books, New York. 1988.

The American Civil War: This Mighty Scourge of War. Gary W. Gallagher, et al, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK. 2003.

 

 

Two disasters in military history

A huge blunder resulting in the end General Burnside's military career. 

This battle also served as yet another dress rehearsal for WW 1 siege warfare. During the assault on Messines Ridge in 1917, the British detonated huge mines along German defenses. In this case, it was successful though the subsequent battle at Passchendaele was disastrous. 

Today in history...

In 1861, this set in motion four of America's most horrible, most heroic, most noble years.

Flashy Lee and Dirty Grant

A while back I made a post (12/28/07) about Union general McClellan and how he would have been far more effective sitting behind a desk than in the field. So here is a post about what I see as his near opposite: Grant. While intelligent, he possessed little elan and dash that many commanders of the day permeated. In fact his early career was unimpressive despite his brave performance in the Mexican War.

When I think of Civil War generals, the first ones to come to mind are Lee and Jackson. Maybe being from Memphis, the Southern generals leap out due to hero worship of most people where I'm from. However on further reading, I find the later Union generals to be the models of the true nature of the Civil War: the first truly total war. Civilians and infrastructure are deliberately targeted. This aspect would be better explained in another posting on Sherman. But Grant approved of this tactic to starve the Confederacy.

In Grant's case, he understood that the defeat of the military would have to come through bloody fighting. The Union Army had numerical and logistical superiority to the Confederates which would be needed to offset their leadership advantage. General Grant constantly pushed his Army hard against the Confederates and won victories in Tennessee valley and Vicksburg, after which he was promoted to Lt. General, last held by George Washington. Even after suffering horrible loses in the Wilderness and Cold Harbor, Grant constantly pressed against well entrenched but weakening Confederate troops. Finally Grant surprised Lee by besieging Petersburg, south of Richmond. Lee's army was forced to endure a 10 month siege, a siege that starved his troops. Finally, he tried to escape but was intercepted at Appomattox Court House. There Lee surrendered.

Grant was not a flashy glamorous leader. (In fact, he came to the surrendered wearing a muddied uniform where Lee's uniform was pristine. This contrast I think shows the difference between the old glamorous view of the soldier compared to the rough and dirty reality.) He was a failure in civilian life and was an alcoholic. Yet for those with a passing knowledge of Civil War history, Lee and the Southern generals stand out, even though they lost.

Perhaps it is natural to see the Civil War or any past war (Napoleon) with a sense of glamor and honor. But to set the Wayback Machine and actually witness first hand that any war would very quickly toss aside their romantic notions and call war for what it is: cruel, dirty, and "Hell."

Rethinking McClellan

When I went to Antietam last year, I came with the idea of finding some good in Union General George McClellan. He has been tainted with negative comments about his action in the Seven Days campaign and of course Antietam, a number of them deserved. It is true he was a less than effectual field commander, hesitant to commit impromptu action because everything wasn't just right. Yet, further research and thought has convinced me there are some good aspects of the commander which are overshadowed by his failures. These positive aspects will come not from McClellan the field commander but as an administrator.

It was McClellan who nursed the Union Army back to health after First Bull Run. When he arrived the Army of the Potomac was in shambles. He spent the summer of 1861 imposing discipline and pride back into the dispirited army, dismissed incompetent officers, and reorganized the camps to make them more comfortable and able to accommodate new recruits. Grand reviews would be staged to raise morale at home and with the troops. In a few months, the Army of the Potomac was a stronger fighting force. Now it was time to utilize it.

President Lincoln was willing to allow time to prepare a plan to end the war. A strategy was presented, one that would divide the Confederacy and force them to sue for peace. On paper, the plan was promising: a three-pronged assault in to the Confederacy: one army would move into Richmond, another would take Kentucky and Tennessee in preparation to march into the heartland of Alabama and Georgia, and a blockade of the Mississippi River and Confederate shores would strangle supplies trade with Europe. This grand strategy would be used to end the war when General Grant achieved victory in 1865.

(Addendum 4/2/09): This plan was in fact the Anaconda Plan originally devised by McClellan's predecessor General Winfield Scott. However, this plan ran afoul of politicians and some generals who favored a limited war approach.)

If McClellan was less of an administrator and engineer and more of a bull, he might have in fact won the war early and would be hailed as the savior of the Union. Even with these two good points on him, the main problem of McClellan was himself. It would take years and thousands of casualties to realize that McClellan was better suited for the desk than the horse.

The Gettysburg trip..at last!

Here it is as promised...the trip to Gettysburg battlefield.

As a student of military history, it gives me a sense of awe to be at a place where a major battle took place. In 1990, I visited the Verdun battlefield during my trip to England. To say I was impressed would be a major understatement. I had read and watched documentaries on Verdun, but I felt elated to actually walk in the footsteps of the soldiers of the time. The same could be said for Gettysburg.

I have always viewed history from a holistic, grand strategic perspective. The extensive details of the battle will not be shown on this blog as there are numerous exhaustive works on the battle. Rather, my thoughts will focus on the larger strategic and political impact of the battle. The battle of Gettysburg resulted from Lee's desire to attempt another offensive operation into Union territory and force the Union to attack his forces and take such losses that President Lincoln would have no choice but to allow the Confederacy to exist. The attack might also draw Union forces away from Vicksburg and possibly lift the siege. A victory might force Europe, namely Britain and France, to intervene and mediate an armistice if not support the Confederacy. This would not likely result since Europe was still wary of the Confederacy's institution of slavery. Moreover, I think Lee and many others wanted to move the fighting from Virginia if only to give the locals a break from the fighting.

The tour began with the memorial to Stuart's calvary, 4th and 5th NC.

It was around this area that the Union and Confederate advance units were to meet. Confederate general Lee was moving into Pennsylvania in order to draw the Union forces into another battle. He hoped to destroy the Union's resolve by inflicting a classic Napoleonic victory against his enemy's army and make them sue for peace.

  Looking down the road, lined with 121st PA memorials. Note the crow in the photo.

The Union received word of the Confederate's movements and sent an advance force in order to gain intelligence. Yet, Gen. Stuart disobeyed Lee's orders to maintain contact with the Union forces by going on a raiding mission against Union stores many miles away. Lee throughout most of the battle would be fighting blind. In fact, the he didn't know the Union was in the area until his forces were engaged. Though the Union had the element of surprise, Lee's advance force was able to push the Union back to the high ground southeast of the city. The engagement allowed both sides to gather their main forces and form battlelines.

Cannon near Rebel position on 1st day.

On an observation platform overlooking Gettysburg. Culp's hill on left, Cemetery Hill to the right. Gettysburg College in distance.

By this time, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia were poised to fight again on the second day. Compared to what was to come, the first day's fighting was a mere skirmish. General Lee was convinced his forces would prevail as they had in the past. His determination and belief that his men could accomplish anything would ultimately be his failure. In short, Lee was suffering from victory disease. There was one problem: the lack of intelligence from Stuart's cavalry. Because of this, Lee wanted to attack the enemy that he could see rather than take Longstreet's more prudent advice of forcing the Union to attack fixed positions.

Base of Little Round Top

Chamberlain was here!

Lee's attempts at taking Little Round Top and other parts of the Union line failed; but from his perspective, it almost succeeded in breaking the Union lines. One more push would undoubtedly break the Union once and for all. His soldiers fought long and hard; it would be a shame to withdraw in the face of a weakened enemy. Yes, one final push would mean victory. Lee's men were invincible, or so he thought. His belief in the fighting spirit of his men and in the Rebel cause would ultimately be his doom.

    Rebel's view of Pickett's charge.

...and the Union's view of Pickett's charge.

Rebel valor could not overcome the tactical error of marching in normal step across open fields. The soldiers became perfect targets for rifled muskets and cannon. As a result, the Rebels were forced to withdraw but the Union did not pursue. Although President Lincoln demanded it, General Meade wisely decided to give his men rest.

I still don't understand why the battle turned out the way it did. My immediate answer would be General Robert E. Lee himself. His desire for a heroic offense against the Union went against the Confederate's grand strategy: draw the Union into attack defensive positions and weaken their resolve. This resolve might have been broken if not for the determination of President Lincoln who was determined to hold the Union together whatever the cost. Overestimating Lee's own fighting strength and underestimating the Union's determination was the classic formula of victory disease. In addition, Lee still labored on the idea of defeating a nation's army directly in order to defeat a nation. By 1864, the Union began to strike at the army's support, namely the production facilities and supply centers around Georgia and besieging their cities in order to force the Confederacy's surrender which came many months later. Gettysburg would be the last of any offensive operations by the Confederate forces. With the initiative lost, Lee would be forced to endure Union attacks and the siege at Petersburg until his defeat in 1865.